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Abstract
The aim of the following study is to investigate the impact of subsidies on firm sales
in Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. This study is based on the
fifth round of Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) that
is implemented by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in
partnership with the World Bank. In order to account for the possibility that subsidy is
jointly determined with the dependent variable lsales through an equilibrium mechanism,
I use simultaneous equations model. According to the estimation results, receiving a
subsidy does not have a significant positive impact on firms’ sales in CIS countries and
Russian Federation. In addition, the results show that larger firms are more likely to
receive a subsidy.
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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of subsidy programs launched by local,
regional or national government, or EU sources on firms’ sales in Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) countries. CIS is a political and economic confederation that
consists of nine member states and two associate members, including Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Two
associate states are Turkmenistan and Ukraine.
As it is known, subsidies granted to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are aimed
to promote productivity growth in the manufacturing sector and thus to foster economic
growth. Taking this fact into account, it is possible to conclude that capital and interest-
rate subsidies granted by the government and other local or international institutions in
CIS countries might lead to improved firm performance, higher sales and profits. This
view is supported by De Long and Summers (1991), who assert that machinery and
equipment investment has a strong association with growth.
Although, subsidies are aimed to promote growth and lead to improved firm perfor-
mance, it might be the case that they are not allocated efficiently and do not reach its
intended beneficiaries. In some cases, already efficient and large firms might receive a
subsidy. Bergström (1998) asserts that resources might be suboptimally allocated, as
politicians and bureaucrats might be more interested in maximizing political objectives
rather than in economic efficiency. In addition, Patacchini and Rapisarda (2003) find
some evidence that in Italy subsidies are more likely to be granted to firms that are in
good health and that would have received finance even without a subsidy. A similar effect
might be present in the context of CIS, as larger firms with higher potential to develop
as well as better financial indicators possibly could have some advantages in receiving a
subsidy.
In this paper, I study the impact of subsidy program on sales of the firm in a si-
multaneous equations framework to account for the possibility that subsidy is jointly
determined with the dependent variable lsales through an equilibrium mechanism. To
estimate simultaneous equations model, cmp routine is used. Modeling in the cmp frame-
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work allows joint estimation of two or more equations with linkages among their error
processes. My findings suggest that the OLS estimates are biased, and subsidy does not
have a significant positive impact on sales of the firm. At the same time, sales has a
significant positive impact on the probability of receiving a subsidy, which is indicative
of the fact that larger firms are more likely to receive a subsidy.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses available literature on subsidy
programs and puts current research into perspective. Section 3 provides background
information on subsidy programs in CIS countries and government decrees. Section 4
describes data used for this study. Section 5 presents methodology, Section 6 provides
explanation of estimation results and Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature Review
There is a number of works in the literature analyzing the impact of subsidy/loan pro-
grams on economic growth and firm performance. Gale (1991) assesses the impact of
subsidy programs on economic growth and welfare while Dihn et al. (2013) empirically
assesses the impact of subsidy programs on firm performance in terms of profits and
employment growth. In addition, Wallsten (2000) addresses the problems of endogeneity
when estimating the impact of subsidy programs on firm performance applying a number
of methods to deal with this issue.
In one of the papers, Gale (1991) provides numerical estimates of the federal lending
on credit allocation and economic efficiency. According to the United States Budget,
since 1980, the federal government had directly subsidized one-third of all nonfederal
borrowing. Taking into account this fact, Gale shows that efficiency costs were large,
approximately 10-15 billion dollars, or 1/3 percent of GNP in 1987. In addition, credit
subsidies have important effects on the allocation of credit, but little effect on aggregate
investment. Moreover, most direct welfare gains appear to accrue to borrowers who would
have received credit without government subsidies.
Dihn et al. (2013) also addresses the issue of the effectiveness of the subsidy program.
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Using the firm-level data, they quantitatively evaluate the effect of interest rate subsidy
program on firm performance and investment behavior during economic recession. Using
the PSM approach, they show that firms that received subsidized loans are more likely
to increase labor, to expand investment and to possess optimistic plans. Authors use the
PSM approach in order to address self-selection issue.
Lee (1996) examines the impact of government industrial policy, including subsidized
credit and tax incentives, on productivity growth in the Korean manufacturing sector.
Empirical results show that subsidized credit and tax incentives were not correlated with
the growth rate of total factor productivity in the promoted industries of the Korean
manufacturing sector. Furthermore, Lee finds that Korean industrial policies have not
been successful in promoting productivity growth.
Bergström (1998) examines the effects on productivity, at the firm level, of capital
subsidies that have been used in Sweden. He finds that that subsidisation can influence
growth, but there is a little evidence that subsidies have affected productivity. Accord-
ing to this study, subsidisation is positively correlated with growth of value added and
productivity of the subsidised firms seems to increase the first year after the subsidies
were granted. But, after the first year it seems that the more subsidies a firm has been
granted, the lower TFP growth is observed. Bergström (1998) asserts that the influence
of important pressure groups can lead to subsidisation of less productive firms. Moreover,
he argues that subsidisation can also make firms less efficient.
Tzelepis and Skuras (2004) examine the effects of regional capital subsidies on four
dimensions of firm performance, namely efficiency, profitability, leverage and growth in
Greece. Authors use the database of firms in Greek food and drinks manufacturing sector
for the period 1982-1996. According to the results of their study, capital subsidization af-
fects solely firm growth. In addition, capital subsidization has a negative and insignificant
impact on the return on assets (ROA).
Using a dataset of firms involved in the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR)
program, Wallsten (2000) find that firms with more employees and patents win more
federal research and development grants from the program, but that the grants do not
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appear to affect employment. In order to control for endogeneity, Wallsten estimates a
multi-equation model. Total SBIR budget of all agency years in which the firm won an
award is used as the instrumental variable.
Pattacchini and Rapisarda (2003) also address the issue of efficiency of subsidy/loan
program using a dataset of Italian firms. Authors share the idea that a proper evaluation
of the effectiveness of credit programs should be based on the fact whether they reach the
intended beneficiaries. Using a unique panel of bank-firm relationships, authors study the
impact of interest-rate subsidies on the total amount of borrowing and the average cost
of borrowing for subsidised firms. To study these impacts the autoregressive distributed
lag panel data model on the whole sample of firms is estimated. By estimating this
model, authors argue that subsidies reach borrowers that could have received finance even
without subsidies. In addition, by estimating the effect of subsidies on non-subsidized
interest rates over time, authors find that a unit change in the size of the subsidy exerts
a significant positive effect.
Jha and Mehta (2008) also numerically evaluate the effectiveness of the rice subsidy
program run by the Philippine’s National Food Authority (NFA). Using the household
consumption expenditure survey data, authors examine program’s performance in terms
of participation and utilization by the poor. Utilizing the Heckman’s model to address the
issue of self-selection, authors find that nonparticipation is probably involuntary, being
the result of limitations or fixed costs in accessing the program. Authors conclude that
the subsidy program could be more effective if it can reach the poor.
3 Subsidy Programs in CIS countries
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a political and economic confederation that
consists of nine member states and two associate members, including Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Two
associate states are Turkmenistan and Ukraine. In October, 2010 heads of the Republic of
Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the
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Republic of Tajikistan signed the Treaty on the Establishment of the Eurasian Economic
Community that was entered into force on May 30, 2001. The Treaty laid the concept
of close and effective trade and economic cooperation to achieve the goals and objectives
defined by the Treaty on the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space. In
2014, Eurasian Economic Community were replaced by the Eurasian Economic Union,
an international organization of regional economic integration. The EAEU ensures free
movement of goods, services, capital and labor, and pursues coordinated, harmonized
and single policy in macroeconomic sphere, transport, industry and agriculture, energy,
foreign trade and investment, customs, technical regulation, competition and antitrust
regulation. The Member States of the Eurasian Economic Union are the Republic of
Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and
the Russian Federation.
According to the Analytical Review on the conditions of small and medium enterprises
in CIS countries, official subsidy programs were initiated in the Russian Federation and
the Republic of Kazakhstan. Government Decrees on provision of subsidies were issued
in the Russian Federation, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova, the Re-
public of Belarus and the Republic of Tajikistan. In Armenia and Azerbaijan government
provides subsidies to firms operating in the agricultural sector.
In Russian Federation, the Ministry of Economic Development has been implementing
a special program of granting subsidies from the federal budget to the budgets of the con-
stituent entities of the Russian Federation to provide support to small and medium-sized
businesses at the regional level since 2005. All the funds are allocated on a competitive
basis among different regions. As of 2011, as the result of this program more than 10,000
enterprises and 170,000 new workplaces were created and about 450,000 jobs were saved.
In 2012, federal budget allocated 20.8 billion rubles (669,46 million dollars) to the devel-
opment of small and medium enterprises, of which 1.8 billion rubles (58 million dollars)
were allocated to the creation of infrastructure facilities, such as business incubators and
industrial parks, while 19 billion rubles (612 million dollars) were spent on provision of
direct subsidies to entrepreneurs, financing of guarantee funds and micro-finance funds.
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The main emphasis of the 2012 Program was to provide access to financial resources
for medium-sized companies, leaders in improving competitiveness and modernization of
the economy. The following subsidy program is aimed at the development of medium
enterprises and firms with innovative potential.
In addition, the Analytical Review on the conditions of small and medium enterprises
in CIS countries states that in Russian Federation a number of subsidies were provided
to support firms located in regions, to support export-oriented firms, to recover costs
related to machinery and equipment spending, to support newly established firms and
organizations as well as to support entrepreneurship among youths.
The Government of Russian Federation issued official decrees on providing a subsidy
for firms with exporting potential and subsidies aimed to recover some of the costs re-
lated to the machinery and equipment spending. On August 12, 2013 the Government of
Russian Federation issued the Decree 687 on the approval of the rules for granting sub-
sidies from the federal budget to light and textile industry organizations for reimbursing
interest payments on credits received in Russian credit organizations in 2013-2015 for
the realization of investment projects for technical modernization. On October 25, 2013,
the Decree 961 on granting subsidies from the federal budget to Russian organizations
exporting industrial products for military purposes to reimburse part of the cost of pay-
ing interest on loans received from Russian credit institutions and the state corporation
Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs (Vnesheconombank) was issued.
In Kazakhstan, the "Damu" fund was established in 1997 with aim to provide finan-
cial assistance to small and medium enterprises. The Fund provides financial assistance
to small and medium enterprises using instruments such as financing of SMEs through
second-tier banks or conditional cash placement programs, interest rate subsidies, provi-
sion of guarantees as well as informational and consultative support. In 2013, according
to the official information published in the Annual Report of the Fund, 1455 projects
received approximately 27 billion tenge (180 million dollars) in the form of interest-rate
subsidy. "Damu" provides financial subsidies to firms operating in manufacturing indus-
try and export-oriented firms.
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The Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan also issued official decrees on provid-
ing a subsidy to support agricultural sector and single industry towns. On March 12, 2011
the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan issued the Decree 322 on the approval of
the rules for the use of targeted current transfers from the Republican budget by regional
budgets and budgets of Astana and Almaty cities to support seed production, as well
as the use of budget subsidies for the laying of queen cells of perennial plantations of
fruit and berry crops, grapes and 1 ton of "basic seeds" of agricultural plants. On April
19, 2012 the Government issued the Decree 488 on approval of the rules for subsidizing
interest rate for loans issued to support agricultural sector. In 2013, the Government
issued decrees on the approval of subsidization rules to increase productivity and quality
of livestock products, support of livestock breeding and seed production, provision of
interest-rate subsidies on loans issued to support agricultural sector and entities of agro-
industrial sector. Government also provided financial support aimed at the development
of single-industry towns. Decree 1449 issued on November 16, 2012 approved the rules
on subsidization of interest rates on loans issued to private enterprises.
The Kyrgyz Republic also provides a number of subsidies to its agricultural sector.
As Dooranov and Maniyeva (2016) report, in 2009, the Kyrgyz Republic established a
voluntary crop insurance scheme, according to which 50% of the cost of the insurance
premium is subsidized from the state budget. In 2011, the Government developed and
implemented a program of concessional lending "Available loans to farmers", within which
1.0 billion soms were allocated with an interest rate of 9% per annum. In 2012, such a
program was continued with the same amount of lending at 7% per annum. In addition, on
January 12, 2013, the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic issued the Decree 10 to support
the development of the processing sector, livestock and crop production. According to
this Decree, farmers should receive loans from commercial banks on preferential terms
for a period of 12 to 24 months.
State program for support of small and medium-sized entrepreneurship in the Republic
of Belarus for the period 2010-2012 was approved by the Decree 1721 of the Council of
Ministers on December 28, 2009. The program consists of seven sections and includes
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47 events. According to this program, regional executive committees and the Belarusian
Fund for the Financial Support of Entrepreneurs provide subsidies for reimbursement of
a part of interest for the use of bank loans.
On April 30, 2012, the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan issued the Decree
201 to approve a State program aimed to Support Entrepreneurship for 2012-2020 period.
One of the aims of this program is to provide government subsidies for small and medium
enterprises.
In Azerbaijan, government provides subsidies to firms operating in the agricultural
sector. According to Trend News Agency article, in 2012 Azerbaijan planned to increase
the total amount of subsidies for the purchase of motor oil and fuel for producers of
agricultural products by 3.964 million manat. From this it is possible to conclude that
government provides subsidies to promote development of firms operating in agricultural
sector.
Armenia also provides a number of subsidies to firms operating in agricultural sector.
According to ARKA News Agency article, in 2011 and on spring 2012, 34,300 economic
entities operating in the agricultural sector were granted affordable loans worth about 25
billion drams. Credits are issued at a rate of 14%, four percent of which are subsidized.
The Government of the Republic of Moldova issued a number of decrees to approve
the allocation of subsidies to support agricultural sector. On January 31, 2012 and on
February, 26, 2013 the Government of the Republic of Moldova issued Decrees 57 and 152
on the approval of the procedure for allocating funds to support agricultural producers.
The following official decrees indicate that a number of subsidies were granted mostly to
agricultural producers.
4 Data Description
For this study I use Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS)
implemented by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in
partnership with the World Bank. BEEPS is a firm-level survey that consists of firms
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represented in manufacturing sector (excluding extraction), retail and residual sectors
including wholesale, hotels, restaurants, transport, storage, communications, IT as well as
construction sector. In terms of size coverage, only formal (registered) companies with 5 or
more employees are eligible for interview. In addition, firms with 100% government/state
ownership are not eligible to participate in a survey.
For the following study, I employ the fifth round of BEEPS. It covers 15,883 enterprises
in 30 countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. As I’m interested in the impact
of subsidy on firm sales in nine Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), namely
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan, I include only these countries to my sample.
The standard Enterprise Survey includes topics on firm characteristics, gender par-
ticipation, access to finance, annual sales, costs of inputs/labor, workforce composition,
bribery, licensing, infrastructure, trade, crime, competition, capacity utilization, land and
permits, taxation, informality, business-government relations, innovation and technology,
and performance measures.
The sampling methodology for BEEPS is stratified random sampling. Compared to
the simple random sample, where all members of the population have the same proba-
bility of being selected, in a stratified random sample all population units are grouped
within homogeneous groups and simple random samples are selected within each group.
This method allows computing estimates for each of the strata with a specified level
of precision. The sampling weights address the varying probabilities of selection across
different strata.
The strata for Enterprise Surveys are firm size, business sector, and geographic region
within a country. As in most economies surveyed by BEEPS, the majority of firms are
small and medium-sized, survey oversamples large firms since larger firms tend to be
engines of job creation. Sector breakdown is usually manufacturing, retail, and other
services. Geographic regions within a country are selected based on which cities/regions
collectively contain the majority of economic activity.
For this study, I am interested in the impact of subsidies on small and medium en-
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terprises. According to the Analytical Review on the conditions of small and medium
enterprises in CIS countries (2013), microorganization is defined as the organization with
less than 10 employees, small organization is defined as the organization with less than
50 employees, while medium organization is defined as the organization with less than
250 employees.
For the reason that I’m going to use simultaneous-equations model, lsales and subsidy
variables are both dependent and explanatory variables.
Log of sales, lsales variable is log of sales of the firm measured in dollars. This
variable is defined by a response to the question: "Total annual sales last fiscal year in
local currency units". According to the BEEPS survey, the average value of sales for
SMEs in CIS countries constitute 3 million dollars.
A subsidy variable indicates whether a particular firm received a subsidy from local,
regional, national government or EU sources over the past 3 years. In the following
survey, a subsidy might be financial as well as a capital subsidy.
For CIS countries, in terms of the BEEPS weights, 358 (3,83%) out of 9,339 firms
received a subsidy. In regional context, 7.81% of firms received a subsidy in Kazakhstan,
7.04% of firm received a subsidy in Kyrgyzstan, followed by Russian Federation (5.31%),
Belarus (2.15%), Moldova (0.60%) and Uzbekistan (0.32%) (Table 3 of the Appendix).
In terms of the industrial sector representation, taking BEEPS weights into account,
70 (19.55%) out of 358 firms that received a subsidy operate in the food industry, 49
(13.69%) in machinery and equipment, 49 (13.69%) in furniture, 42 (11.73%) in textiles,
30 (8.38.%) in plastics and rubber, 25 (6.98%) in non-metallic and mineral products, 25
(6.98%) in fabricated metal products, 25 (6.98%) in electronics industry, while other firms
operate in publishing/printing and recorded media, chemicals and garments industries.
In terms of the BEEPS weights, a small number of observations is observed for vari-
ables representing percentage of fixed assets, workers’ education (in years) and hours
of operation in a week. This is due to the fact that smaller number of firms provided
responses to questions on which those variables were defined.
In addition, firms which were granted a subsidy are larger in size and have a larger
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Variable Subsidised firms Non-subsidised firms
Workers (mean value) 94.41 51.12
Sales (mean value in dollars) 6,217,948 2,875,431
Table 1: Summary table for CIS countries.
number of workers compared to firms which did not receive subsidy. In terms of sales
figure, for firms which were granted a subsidy the average value of sales variable is
6,217,948 dollars, while for firms which did not receive a subsidy, the average value of
sales variable is 2,875,431 dollars. In terms of the number of workers, for non-subsidised
firms, the average number of workers does not exceed 51.12, while for SME’s involved in
the subsidy program the average number of workers is 94.41. These figures show that
two variables, subsidy and sales are causing each other. In order to account for this fact,
it would be better to estimate simultaneous equations model, where subsidy variable will
be jointly determined with lsales variable through an equilibrium mechanism.
5 Methodology
As it might be the case that subsidy might has a positive impact on firm performance,
and at the same time receiving a subsidy itself depends on sales, subsidy variable could
be endogenous. To be more explicit, subsidy is jointly determined with the dependent
variable lsales through an equilibrium mechanism. For this reason, in order to solve endo-
geneity problem, I estimate simultaneous equations model. This model is non-recursive,
as endogenous variables figure in one another’s equations and error terms are correlated.
To estimate simultaneous equations model, cmp routine is used. According to Baum
(2016), modeling in the cmp framework allows joint estimation of two or more equations
with linkages among their error processes. In addition, CMP modeling framework is
similar to seemingly unrelated regressions, but in a much broader sense. The individual
equations need not be classical regressions with a continuous dependent variable. In
the following model, lsales is a continuous dependent variable, while subsidy is a binary
dependent variable.
According to Roodman (2011), cmp implements an estimator for all the model types
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except rank-ordered probit, and it allows mixing of these models in multiequation systems.
Although cmp is written as a SUR estimator, it works for a substantially larger class of
simultaneous-equation systems.
In the following model, two equations are
lsales = α1subsidy+ b1X + γ1Z1 + ui1,
subsidy = α2lsales+ b2X + γ2Z2 + ui2,
where X includes variables on firm characteristics presented in Table 4 of the Appendix
and variables representing 8 CIS countries. There is no overcontrolling problem, as none
of the variables included in X are not highly correlated with each other.
In the following model, I assume that joint probability distribution function of error
terms u1i and ui2 is a bivariate normal probability distribution function (PDF).
Due to the fact that a larger number of firms is observed for the Russian Federation,
it is chosen as the base country for this model.
Z1 includes instrumental variables for lsales, which are education and educsq, employ-
ees’ education in years and its square term. Z2 includes foodind, instrumental variable
for subsidy. A dummy variable foodind indicates whether a firm operates in the food
industry or not. Statistically, foodind is a good candidate for IV, as it is uncorrelated
with u1i, but partially and sufficiently strongly correlated with subsidy once the other
independent variables are controlled for. In the same way, education is a good candidate
for IV, as it is uncorrelated with ui2 and strongly correlated with lsales.
First equation describes financial performance of firms, measured in terms of sales,
while the second equation describes decision that is made by local, regional and national
commission. Secondly, independent variables except lsales and subsidy are exogenous, or
uncorrelated with the supply and demand errors, ui1 and ui2.
In a given simultaneous equations model, it is assumed that both equations are iden-
tified or satisfy both rank and order conditions. The first equation in a given system
of equations satisfies order condition, as foodind, instrumental variable for subsidy, is
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omitted from this equation. I assume that once firm characteristics are controlled for,
foodind variable does not have a significant effect on sales of the firm. This could be
explained by the fact that industry type does not significantly alter sales of the firm, as
we are not controlling whether a firm operating in the food industry is related to services
or production. Moreover, operating in the food industry does not directly affect finan-
cial performance, compared to firm characteristics and market conditions like equipment
costs, modernization of technology, introduction of new marketing methods, number of
competitors, etc.
Variable foodind is assumed to be a good instrument for the probability of receiving a
subsidy, as firms operating in the food or agricultural industry are more likely to receive a
subsidy. This is consistent with the Decrees summarized in Section 3, according to which
subsidies are granted mostly to firms operating in the agricultural sector. As in the
following dataset, there is no information provided indicating whether a particular firm
is operating in the agricultural sector, I used foodind variable as the proxy. In addition
to this, first equation satisfies rank condition as foodind variable is highly significantly
different from zero in the second equation.
In the same way, second equation also satisfies both rank and order conditions. It is
assumed that once foodind and other firm characteristics are controlled for, education does
not significantly affect the probability of receiving a subsidy. I assume that employees’
education measured in years does not affect probability of receiving a subsidy, as subsidies
are granted based on special rules determined within the framework of the program.
According to the subsidy programs and government decrees discussed in Section 3, a
firm is granted a subsidy only if its activity is compatible with the requirements of the
program.
Variables education and educsq have nonzero population coefficients in the first equa-
tion and are assumed to be a good IVs for lsales variable. I assume that the higher the
education level of the employees is, the higher are the sales and better is the financial
performance of a firm. A firm with specialists in research and development, as well as
specialists in marketing is more likely to improve the quality of the product and increase
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its sales volume. On the other hand, as firms expand, they require a number of educated
specialists in different fields - lawyers to settle down the disputes, scientists to do a re-
search, specialists in marketing to recruit new products, as well as employees specialized
in transport and logistics.
6 Results
According to the estimation results of the probit model, which are shown in Table 6 of
the Appendix, sales of the firm have a significant positive impact on the probability of
receiving a subsidy. 1% increase in sales of the firm, on average, increases the probability
of receiving a subsidy by 0.007%, while 10% increase in sales increases probability of
receiving a subsidy by 0.07%. In terms of the average marginal effects, the average
difference in the expected value of subsidy associated with the fact that a firm licensed
technology is 3.24%. The average difference in the expected value of subsidy associated
with the fact that a firm purchases or licenses inventions is 1.60%. These results are
consistent with the subsidy programs in CIS, as innovative firms are more likely to receive
a subsidy in these countries.
Location in the capital city has a significant negative impact on the probability of
receiving a subsidy. The average difference in the expected value of subsidy associated
with the fact that a firm is located in the capital city amounts to 3.18%. In other words,
location in the capital city decreases the probability of receiving a subsidy on average
by 3.18%. This could be explained by the fact that a number of subsidy programs in
CIS countries are aimed at the development of small and medium enterprises in regions,
industrial cities and rural areas.
Having a line of credit or a loan also increases the probability of receiving a subsidy
by 5.44%. So, as it was assumed, a firm with a line of credit or a loan might have a better
financial performance and thus, is more likely to receive a subsidy.
In terms of the country effects, coefficients for Belarus, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and
Moldova are negative and significant. These results could be explained by the fact that
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a smaller percentage of firms received a subsidy in these countries compared to Russian
Federation, which is a base country in this model (Table 3 of the Appendix). Variables
representing Azerbaijan, Armenia and Tajikistan are omitted from the equation, as a per-
fect collinearity was reported. This can be explained by the fact that a small percentage
of firms received a subsidy in these countries.
Results of the OLS estimation reported in Table 7 of the Appendix show that receiving
a subsidy increases sales of the firm by 19.5% holding everything else constant. As it
might be the case that subsidy might be associated with different aspects of the firm
mission, including research and development and purchasing or licensing innovations, I
added interaction terms, sub*RD and sub*inventions. With the inclusion of interaction
terms the impact of subsidy on sales of the firm becomes insignificant. At the same time,
for firms which purchased or licensed inventions, receiving a subsidy increases sales by
67.6%, holding other factors fixed. However, for firms doing RD, subsidy does not have
any significant positive impact on sales. According to the estimation results, the effect is
negative and insignificant.
In terms of the country effects, coefficients for Belarus, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Moldova,
Azerbaijan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan are negative and significant. These results could
be explained by the fact that firms’ sales is less compared to that of Russian Federation.
The results of simultaneous equations model show that receiving a subsidy from local,
national or regional government does not have a significant impact on firm sales in CIS
countries, a result which differs from the result obtained from the least squares estimation.
This difference in subsidy coefficients could be the outcome of the endogeneity issue, as
it might be the case that subsidy variable is correlated with ui1. Hence, the results of the
OLS estimation overestimate the impact of receiving a subsidy on sales.
In addition, firms located in the capital city have larger sales by 50.3% compared to
firms which are not located in the capital city. Age of the firm also has a significant
positive impact on sales of the firm, as every year increases sales by 3.07%. As it was pre-
dicted, exports, licensing of technology, purchasing and licensing inventions, equipment
and machinery spending have a significant positive impact on sales of the firm. It should
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be noted that the estimation results of the simultaneous equations model do not differ
significantly from that of the OLS estimation results.
At the same time, sales of the firm have a significant positive impact on probability of
receiving a subsidy. 1% increase in sales increases the probability of receiving a subsidy
by 0.77%, while 10% increase in sales increases the probability of receiving a subsidy by
7.7%. This indicates that the OLS estimates are biased, and firms with larger sales are
much more likely to receive a subsidy.
In terms of the effects on the probability of receiving a subsidy, the results of simul-
taneous equations model show that on average, location in the capital city decreases the
probability of receiving a subsidy by 23.3%. This is a significantly larger effect compared
to that of the probit model, according to which location in the capital city decreases the
probability of receiving a subsidy by 3.18%, on average. Interestingly, according to the
simultaneous equations model, licensing a technology and purchasing or licensing inven-
tions no longer have a positive significant effect on the probability of receiving a subsidy.
On the contrary, the effect is negative and insignificant.
The beta coefficient for having a line of credit or a loan variable is larger in the
simultaneous model, 18.7% compared to 5.44% of the probit model. The same could be
said for the foodind variable, as based on the cmp framework, a firm operating in the food
industry is more likely to receive a subsidy. Operating in the food industry increases the
probability of receiving a subsidy by 5.8%, which is significantly larger compared to the
estimate of the probit model, 1.89%. This is also indicative of the fact that foodind is a
good instrument for subsidy.
7 Conclusion
In the following paper, using the data from the BEEPS survey, I tried to evaluate whether
a subsidy has a significant positive impact on sales of the firm in CIS countries. To
evaluate this, I used the results of the probit model, OLS estimation, and the simultaneous
equations model.
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To estimate simultaneous equations model, cmp command is used. According to Baum
(2016), modeling in the cmp framework allows joint estimation of two or more equations
with linkages among their error processes. In the following simultaneous equations model,
I assume that joint probability distribution function of error terms u1i and ui2 is a bi-
variate normal probability distribution function (PDF). According to Roodman (2011),
cmp implements an estimator for all the model types except rank-ordered probit, and it
allows mixing of these models in multiequation systems. Although cmp is written as an
SUR estimator, it works for a substantially larger class of simultaneous-equation systems.
According to the results of the OLS estimation, receiving a subsidy increases sales
of the firm by 19.5% holding everything else constant. However, as there might be an
endogeneity issue, I use simultaneous equations model. According to the simultaneous
equations model results, it is possible to conclude that receiving a subsidy does not have a
significant positive impact on firms’ sales in CIS countries. This result is compatible with
the previous studies, according to which subsidy does not have a significant impact on firm
performance indicators, such as productivity and return on assets (ROA). At the same
time, sales of the firm have a significant positive impact on the probability of receiving
a subsidy in CIS countries. So, it is possible to conclude that there is a selectivity bias,
as larger firms are more likely to receive a subsidy. In particular, 1% increase in sales
increases the probability of receiving a subsidy by 0.77% in CIS countries. In addition to
selectivity bias, this result could be explained by the fact that firms which are going to
be promoted already large and have a better potential to develop.
It should be noted that to get better and more plausible results, it is better to look at
other indicators of firm performance, such as profits, return on assets, productivity and
growth. In addition, it might be better to examine the effect of subsidies in longer term,
not in a short term.
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Appendix
Year Document
2013 Decree 687 of the Government of the Russian Federation 12.08.2013 (expired on 28.01.2017)
2013 Decree 961 of the Government of the Russian Federation 25.10.2013
2012 Decree 322 of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan 12.03.2012
2012 Decree 488 of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan 19.04.2012
2012 Decree 679 of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan 25.05.2012
2012 Decree 1449 of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan 16.11.2012
2013 Decree 35 of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan 25.01.2013 (expired on 03.03.2014)
2013 Decree 36 of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan 25.01.2013 (expired on 03.03.2014)
2013 Decree 129 of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan 13.02.2013 (expired on 04.06.2014
2013 Decree 202 of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan 28.02.2013 (expired on 02.07.2015)
2013 Decree 304 of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan 29.03.2013 (expired on 23.05.2015)
2013 Decree 816 of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan 09.08.2013 (expired on 01.01.2014)
2013 Decree 1542 of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan 31.12.2013 (expired on 21.09.2015)
2012 Decree 57 of the Government of the Republic of Moldova 31.01.2012
2013 Decree 152 of the Government of the Republic of Moldova 26.02.2013
Table 2: List of Decrees on subsidies in CIS countries
Source: Internet Source on the Legislation of the CIS countries, base.spinform.ru
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Country Number of firms Number of firms Percentage
which received a subsidy which did not receive a subsidy
Armenia 0 113 0%
Azerbaijan 0 12 0%
Belarus 38 1726 2.15%
Kazakhstan 66 779 7.81%
Kyrgyzstan 10 132 7.04%
Moldova 2 329 0.60%
Russian Federation 237 4228 5.31%
Tajikistan 0 90 0%
Uzbekistan 5 1572 0.32%
Table 3: A number of firms which received a subsidy in CIS countries
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Firm characteristics
Location in the official capital city
Age of the establishment: less than 5 years
Direct and indirect exports as % of total annual sales, more than 30%
Technology licensed from a foreign-owned company
Purchase/license inventions
A line of credit or a loan Government/State ownership (%)
Firm’s current legal status
Number of permanent, full-time individuals working at the end of last fiscal year
Fixed assets (internal funds or retained earnings) (%)
Availability of training programs for permanent full-time employees
Table 4: Firm characteristics
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Table 5: Summary statistics for firms in CIS countries
Mean SD Min Max Obs
Log of sales 13.244 1.992 6.224 19.307 9339
Subsidy 0.038 0.192 0 1 9339
Capital city 0.350 0.477 0 1 9339
Age 12.714 9.814 1 88 9339
Age squared 257.955 599.154 1 7744 9339
Exports 5.316 17.336 0 1 9339
Food industry 0.105 0.306 0 1 9339
Technology licensed 0.107 0.0.309 0 1 9339
Purchase/license inventions 0.052 0.222 0 1 9339
A line of credit/loan 0.338 0.473 0 1 9339
Legal status 0.859 0.349 0 1 9339
Government ownership 0.693 6.265 0 90 9339
Number of workers 52.782 58.224 3 251 9339
Fixed assets(%) 83.302 32.285 0 100 9339
Workers’ education(years) 12.720 2.094 3 20 9339
Training programs 0.422 0.494 0 1 9339
Armenia 0.012 0.109 0 1 9339
Azerbaijan 0.001 0.036 0 1 9339
Belarus 0.189 0.391 0 1 9339
Kazakhstan 0.091 0.287 0 1 9339
Kyrgyzstan 0.015 0.122 0 1 9339
Moldova 0.035 0.185 0 1 9339
Russian Federation 0.478 0.500 0 1 9339
Tajikistan 0.010 0.098 0 1 9339
Uzbekistan 0.169 0.375 0 1 9339
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Table 6: Regression Results of the probit model for firms in CIS countries
Probit (marginal effects)
Dependent variable Subsidy
Log of sales 0.007∗∗∗
(0.002)
Capital city -0.032∗∗∗
(0.006)
Age of the firm 0.003∗∗∗
(0.000)
Agesq -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)
Direct and Indirect sales exported 0.0002
(0.000)
Food industry 0.019∗∗∗
(0.005)
Technology licensed 0.032∗∗∗
(0.005)
Purchase/license inventions 0.016∗
(0.007)
A line of credit or a loan 0.054∗∗∗
(0.004)
Legal status -0.004
(0.006)
Government/State ownership (%) 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000)
Number of workers 0.000
(0.000)
Fixed assets (%) -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)
Education, workers (years) -0.005
(0.005)
Educsq -0.000
(0.000)
Training programs -0.009∗
(0.004)
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Table 6: Regression Results of the probit model for firms in CIS countries (continued)
Probit (marginal effects)
Dependent variable Subsidy
Belarus -0.088∗∗∗
(0.009)
Tajikistan
Uzbekistan -0.061∗∗∗
(0.015)
Kazakhstan 0.003
(0.005)
Moldova -0.078∗∗∗
(0.016)
Azerbaijan
Armenia
Kyrgyzstan 0.028∗
(0.011)
Observations 9124
∗ robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
25
Table 7: Regression Results of the OLS estimation and SEM model for firms in CIS
countries
OLS OLS SEM
Dependent variable Log of sales Log of sales Log of sales
Subsidy 0.195∗ 0.183 0.236
(0.079) (0.095) (0.230)
sub*RD -0.271
(0.150)
sub*inventions 0.676∗∗
(0.254)
Capital city 0.423∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.090)
Age of the firm 0.038∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008)
Agesq -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Direct and Indirect sales exported 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Technology licensed 0.662∗∗∗ 0.670∗∗∗ 0.582∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.042) (0.110)
Purchase/license inventions 0.478∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.071) (0.084)
A line of credit or a loan 0.063∗ 0.061∗ -0.056
(0.030) (0.030) (0.142)
Legal status -0.291∗∗∗ -0.289∗∗∗ -0.282∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.043)
Government/State ownership (%) -0.009∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗ -0.012∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Number of workers 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Fixed assets (%) 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Education, workers (years) 0.418∗∗∗ 0.407∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.050) (0.082)
Educsq -0.019∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.054) (0.004)
Training programs 0.845∗∗∗ 0.851∗∗∗ 0.854∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.238)
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Table 7: Regression Results of the OLS estimation and SEM model for firms in CIS
countries (continued)
OLS OLS SEM
Dependent variable Log of sales Log of sales Log of sales
Belarus -0.807∗∗∗ -0.805∗∗∗ -0.563∗
(0.037) (0.037) (0.238)
Tajikistan -2.124∗∗∗ -2.124∗∗∗ -1.774∗∗∗
(0.140) (0.140) (0.391)
Uzbekistan -1.722∗∗∗ -1.723∗∗∗ -1.558∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.045) (0.180)
Kazakhstan 0.061 0.070 0.064
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
Moldova -1.160∗∗∗ -1.160∗∗∗ -1.006∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.098) (0.199)
Azerbaijan -5.828∗∗∗ -5.821∗∗∗ -4.783∗∗∗
(0.259) (0.259) (1.04)
Armenia -1.295∗∗∗ -1.294∗∗∗ -1.084∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.103) (0.250)
Kyrgyzstan -0.703∗∗∗ -0.708∗∗∗ -0.773∗∗∗
(0.186) (0.187) (0.208)
Constant 9.941∗∗∗ 10.000∗∗∗ 11.000∗∗∗
(0.337) (0.338) (0.760)
Observations 9339 9339 9339
∗ robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 8: Regression Results of the SEM model for firms in CIS countries table
SEM (margins)
Dependent variable Subsidy
Log of sales 0.770∗∗∗
(0.055)
Capital city -0.233∗∗∗
(0.024)
Age of the firm 0.001
(0.003)
Agesq 0.000
(0.000)
Direct and Indirect sales exported -0.001∗
(0.001)
Technology licensed -0.042
(0.029)
Purchase/license inventions -0.056
(0.033)
A line of credit or a loan 0.187∗∗∗
(0.028)
Legal status 0.062∗
(0.029)
Government/State ownership (%) 0.009∗∗∗
(0.001)
Number of workers -0.004∗∗∗
(0.001)
Fixed assets (%) -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
Training programs -0.246∗∗∗
(0.023)
Food industry 0.058∗
(0.023)
Belarus -0.155∗
(0.069)
Uzbekistan 0.201∗
(0.082)
Kazakhstan -0.013
(0.022)
Moldova 0.031
(0.079)
Kyrgyzstan 0.289∗∗∗
(0.067)
Constant -10.90∗∗∗
(0.531)
Observations 9339
∗ robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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